Put yourself in a position where you don't need to do anything and have no distractions.
Now, use your free will to choose to think no thoughts at all for just five minutes.
If you're like me or anyone I know (including heavy meditators), you won't be able to clear your mind. Thoughts will just ... occur.
The implications of this are many and profound. But even before considering what this means, take a second to note how powerful it is to notice the lack of control.
Most people assert they have free will because they can feel it. But experiencing thoughts thinking themselves despite our "conscious choice" is simple but indisputable proof of our lack of control over our thoughts. (More examples if needed.)
This is difficult to even consider, let alone accept and internalize. I've heard many smart people insist they have free will; on a podcast I heard recently, a brilliant person contended they "could not go on" if they didn't have free will. But of course they can. It is exactly like saying we know there is a god and we couldn't go on if there weren't.
I've said a great deal about the implications of recognizing we have no free will; I think this is the single best post. Personally, I'll be trying to draw on those insights in the coming days and weeks.
More on this in the "Brains!" chapter of Losing My Religions, which you can read for free.
5 comments:
Hey Matt, I think this is a valuable insight, I ran into an interesting discussion the other day about this, I think involving a NFW advocate, a compatibilist and me (it did not take place in a bar but rather in the [Less Wrong comments](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/k8Sipeiu9nMnNhddD/the-other-existential-crisis)) and I think I made my best (short) explanation for my position on this that I've made so far, and it maps to what you are saying about the brain essentially serving up options involuntarily.
Hopefully, you can manage to jump on half way (and have it still make sense).
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I think this disagreement might actually be largely a semantic one. As such, I'm going to (try to) avoid using the terms 'libertarian' or 'compatibilist' free will. First of all I agree with the use of "indeterminism" to mean non-uniform randomness. I agree that there is a way that determinism and indeterminism can be mixed in such a way as give rise to an emergent property that is not present in either purely determined or purely random systems. I understand this in relation to the idea of evolutionary "design" which emerges from a system that necessarily has both determined and indeterminate properties (indeterminate at least at the level of the genes, they might not be ultimately indeterminate).
I'm going to employ a [decision-making map](https://nonzerosum.games/Images/Content/Determinism_Loop.png) that seeks to clarify my understanding of the how we make decisions and where we might get "what we want" from.
As I see it, the items in white are largely set, and change only gradually, and with no sense of control involved. I don't believe we have any control over our genes, our intentions or desires, what results our actions will have, of the world—I also don't think we have any control over our model of ourselves or the world, those are formed subconsciously. But our effort (in the green areas) allows for deliberative decision making, following an evolutionary selection process, in which our conscious awareness is involved.
In this way we are not beholden to the first action available to us, we can, instead of taking an action in the world, make a series of simulated actions in our head, consciously experiencing the predicted outcome of those actions, until we find a satisfactory one. So, you don't end up with a determined or a random solution, you end up with an option based on your conscious experience of your simulated options. This process satisfies my wants in terms of my sense that I have some control (when I make the effort) over my decisions. At the same time, I'm agnostic about whether true indeterminism exists at all, but, like with evolution, with randomness at the level of the cell (that may not be ultimately random), I think even in an entirely determined universe, we exist on a level that is subject to, at least, some apparent indeterminism. And even if that apparent indeterminism turns out to be determined, our (eternal) inability to calculate what is determined, still means we have no grounds to act in any way other than as if we have the control we feel we have.
I'm actually not sure if this makes me a compatibilist or not.
I'll be curious as to your take on Sapolsky's "Determined"
Hey Matt, I've started "Behave" in audiobook but quickly realised that probably wasn't the appropriate format to absorb that level of detail. I haven't read "Determined" and wasn't so keen until I'd properly defined my own position (as I'd heard him say a couple of things that sounded eerily like straw-manning—though I've now shifted my definitions now, so I no longer feel affronted by a straw-men versions of free-will now that I've abandoned defending that term).
I'm interested to be informed about it, but didn't want to be explicitly preached to about it while I was still formulating my current position (which is changeable, but was vague and a little confused previously)
I don't think my [current position](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/BtqpKqeMybCFiA7er/a-case-for-conscious-significance-rather-than-free-will) is at odds with any definition of determinism.
Sapolsky is very kind, gentle, and thoughtful. He isn't (IMO) arrogant like some authors. (There is a place for that, but it isn't Sapolsky.)
Also, I think you are right - audiobook might not be the best. He is good on various podcasts, though, which we've also consumed.
Man, I need to stop writing long comments on my phone, my grammar is all over the shop.
"Determined" is on my list for this year, I've just put it on hold at the library—but there are 13 copies and 29 people in the queue, so it might be some time before I get to it.
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